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Interpreting Shadows: Arms Control and Defense Planning in a Rapidly Changing Multi-Polar World

David R. King

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**INTERPRETING SHADOWS:
ARMS CONTROL AND DEFENSE
PLANNING IN A RAPIDLY
CHANGING MULTI-POLAR
WORLD**

David R. King

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR:

Captain Dave King is an Instructor of Management at the United States Air Force (USAF) Academy. He received a Bachelor of Science degree in Management and Behavioral Science from the USAF Academy in 1990 and a Masters of Science in Logistics Management from the Air Force Institute of Technology in 1995. Captain King's Masters thesis, "A Review of Fighter Aircraft Capability for Smart Bombs," was used by a major defense contractor as the basis for a proposal to the Pentagon for improving the air-to-ground capabilities of the F-15C. An acquisition officer, Captain King has had a wide range of practical experience in weapons development and arms transfers. Examples of his experience include helping track and develop the first Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) deployments, the initial F-15 Theater Missile Defense (TMD) demonstrations, and the sale of five F-15D aircraft to an allied country.

Comments pertaining to this paper are invited; please forward to:

Director, USAF Institute for National Security Studies
HQ USAFA/DFES
2354 Fairchild Drive, Suite 5L27
USAF Academy, CO 80840
phone: 719-333-2717
fax: 719-333-2716
email: smithjm.dfe@usafa.af.mil

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FOREWORD

We are pleased to publish this twenty-sixth volume in the *Occasional Paper* series of the US Air Force Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). In it, Captain King questions the broadened relevance of traditional means and modes of arms control and nuclear deterrence within the current multi-polar world. He advocates a balancing approach to complex power relationships and a continuing emphasis on the arms control process. However, he suggests building that renewed effort around a new strategy centered on a "conventional triad" coupled with diplomacy. This kind of political-military strategic thinking warrants thoughtful consideration as we forge into a new security era. This specific recommendation may not be THE answer, but its presentation represents the kinds of questions we all need to ask.

About the Institute

INSS is primarily sponsored by the National Security Policy Division, Nuclear and Counterproliferation Directorate, Headquarters US Air Force (HQ USAF/XONP) and the Dean of the Faculty, USAF Academy. Our other sponsors currently include the Air Staff's Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Directorate (XOI); the Secretary of Defense's Office of Net Assessment (OSD/NA); the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (incorporating the sponsorship of the Defense Special Weapons Agency and the On-Site Inspection Agency); the Army Environmental Policy Institute; the Plans Directorate of the United States Space Command; and the Air Force long-range plans directorate (XPXP). The mission of the Institute is "to promote national security research for the Department of Defense within the military academic community, and to support the Air Force national security

education program.” Its research focuses on the areas of greatest interest to our organizational sponsors: arms control, proliferation, regional studies, Air Force policy, information warfare, environmental security, and space policy.

INSS coordinates and focuses outside thinking in various disciplines and across the military services to develop new ideas for defense policy making. To that end, the Institute develops topics, selects researchers from within the military academic community, and administers sponsored research. It also hosts conferences and workshops and facilitates the dissemination of information to a wide range of private and government organizations. INSS is in its seventh year of providing valuable, cost-effective research to meet the needs of our sponsors. We appreciate your continued interest in INSS and our research products.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "James M. Smith". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "James" written in a larger, more prominent script than the last name "Smith".

JAMES M. SMITH
Director

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

General Issue

Cold War thinking continues to guide United States' policy in the Post-Cold War environment. Continuing to pursue policies forged during the Cold War will not be adequate to address proliferation for two reasons. First, Cold War policies do not reflect changes in the world in respect to other major or regional powers. Second, current policies overlook potential long-term counterproductive consequences. Adopting an overarching national policy on arms control will require understanding different world views of the United States, other major powers, and regional powers.

World Views

American foreign policy advocates hold several different worldviews. Consensus behind the Cold War policies of containment and nuclear deterrence was the result of an overwhelming threat and not consensus on an underlying worldview. American worldviews can be divided into at least six categories:

- *Domestic Focus*--advocates reducing defense expenditures to focus on domestic issues and increasing economic competitiveness.
- *Balance of Power*--views international relations as being based on competing national objectives where nations try to avoid a single nation dominating the international stage or strategic areas.
- *Global Leadership*--advocates the United States pursue policies that would forestall a return to a balance of power and maintain sole superpower status.
- *International Norms*--views increased interdependence and shared norms as a method of decreasing conflict.
- *Spread of Western Values*--advocates the United States promote

the universal values of liberal democracy and market economies, because of a belief that a world based on these values would be a better place.

- *Autonomy*--advocates the United States taking more unilateral action where visions of transforming the world are replaced by pragmatic flexibility.

Russia and China are the two most important countries for the United States to consider in the Post-Cold World because of their size, military power, and economic potential. Both Russia and China desire a larger international role and already possess veto power in the United Nations Security Council. This desire is leading both nations to pursue policies for domestic and international reasons that do not support American initiatives. Additionally, both countries have internal problems.

Negotiations with Russia and China without considering their views will have limited success. Of particular interest for arms control initiatives is that both nations are assisting regional nations in developing nuclear and ballistic missile technology. In the case of India and Pakistan, Russia and China are supplying material and technology to each side respectively.

Regional powers are concerned about increased activism by the United States because intervention in internal conflicts threatens their sovereignty. Regional nations may conclude that possessing weapons of mass destruction is the only way of deterring major powers from becoming involved in their affairs. When there is an international crisis, it is important to realize that even when the crisis is an external event for a regional power, its root cause is more often a function of internal problems; therefore, the stakes to the regional leader are higher. This leads to an asymmetry of stakes where the leaders of a regional power are fighting for their survival, making them harder to deter. An

important consideration is that regional leaders can perceive the risk of not taking action as higher than risking action. In summary, regional powers may act in seemingly irrational ways that can be rational when the perspective of the regional leadership is taken into account.

A Case for Balance of Power

When consideration is made for the views of major and regional powers, the balance of power worldview appears the most descriptive of what is happening. Balance of power better explains the lack of a unifying strategy in Post-Cold War America because the multi-polar environment does not directly threaten the continued survival of the United States. In fact, a single overarching policy may be inappropriate for today's decentralized world. Additionally, historical evidence indicates that balances of power recurrently form and become evident when one nation acquires over half of the coercive capability in the international system. For example, the United States was expected to dominate the post-World War II world; however, the Soviet Union emerged as an antagonist. Similarly, the United States currently enjoys dominance in world affairs and this is leading other nations to balance our influence.

Current Arms Control Policies

In reviewing current policy options some key findings emerge. First, the United States needs to develop closer relationships with countries that will have an impact on key regions. Key considerations in building these relationships are that the country has a similar government, an open economy, a professional military, and adequate infrastructure to support joint military exercises. Second, deterrence is still required, but nuclear deterrence by the United States is less credible and counterproductive to non-proliferation. The result is that conventional deterrence needs to be developed and demonstrated. Additionally, the role of the Air Force will probably increase in scenarios with regional powers possessing weapons

of mass destruction because of their quick deployment and long-range precision-strike capabilities. Third, economic sanctions are ineffective and hurt the population and not the leaders they are targeted against. There may be situations where multilateral sanctions would be appropriate; however, the United States should discontinue implementing unilateral economic sanctions. Fourth, export controls have been used to limit proliferation and support the Non-Proliferation Treaty. However, more can be done to limit the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons through unilateral and multilateral export controls. Fifth, military assistance, when provided, needs to focus more on infrastructure development and deal less with weapon system sales. Building a nation's infrastructure has the dual purpose of aiding their economy and facilitating joint military exercises. Finally, confidence-building measures need to be given the status of a serious diplomatic initiative because the success of confidence-building measures requires the same consideration and effort as other options discussed.

A New Framework

The focus of arms control is changing. It now deals with issues affecting all nations and not just the super powers. A new framework for approaching non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and arms control could focus on a two-fold policy initiative. The first policy would be a new strategic "triad" built around conventional capability including rapidly deployable forces, regional ballistic missile defense, and long-range precision-strike capability. The second policy would employ an information strategy using the current diplomatic initiatives that appear to be the most productive, or unilateral and multilateral export controls, military assistance in the form of infrastructure, and confidence building measures.

Conclusion

The world is a much different place after the Cold War, and continued success requires abandoning Cold War policies. Emerging policies will need to appreciate different worldviews in the United States and other nations. Following a balance of power orientation will allow policy makers to tailor policies to different challenges without being restricted by an overarching tenet. Good intelligence will be a key factor in the success of any policy orientation and its implementation. Arms control remains important in the Post-Cold War world, but its focus needs to change from arms control involving the superpowers to arms control for everyone. If the United States is not proactive in influencing other nations, others with ideas potentially adverse to American interests will fill that role. A potential framework for arms control policies involving a conventional triad and diplomatic initiatives is suggested to stimulate discussion.

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Interpreting Shadows:
Arms Control and Defense Planning in a
Rapidly Changing Multi-Polar World

Human beings living in an underground den.... Like ourselves...they only see their own shadows, or the shadows of one another, which the fire throws on the opposite wall of the cave.

Plato, The Republic

The people in Plato's cave are a metaphor of how human perception distorts the truth. The truth is what casts the shadow; however, people can only see and operate from what they see in their own mind—the shadow. Differences in opinion result from the different worldviews or mindsets people use to view external developments.

General Issue

During the Cold War, enduring mindsets developed on both sides of the East/West struggle. Toward the end of the Cold War these mindsets blinded defense planners to current challenges even though new challenges began to emerge before the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Part of the problem was that the Cold War lasted so long that it became second nature to more than one generation of security analysts. Unfortunately, Cold War thinking processes have continued to guide United States' policy in the years after the Cold War.¹ Improvements in military technology and the end of the Cold War require that new Arms Control and Defense Planning paradigms be developed to meet the challenges of the current multi-polar environment. It is important to note that proliferation of conventional strategic weapons and weapons of mass destruction have not been limited to the Cold War Super Powers.

Competing Worldviews

The United States is the sole remaining super power now that the Cold War has ended. However, no overarching national policy has been developed to lead American national strategy into the current international environment. This is tempered by the fact that the transition to the Cold War policies of Containment and (nuclear) Deterrence was not an obvious solution at the beginning of the Super Power conflict.² Instead containment and nuclear deterrence developed over time just as policies to deal with current challenges will emerge. It is crucial to look at the different views of the world from the standpoint of the United States, other major powers, and regional powers when developing an arms control paradigm. The paradigms developed to deal with the current environment will reflect mindsets of the world just as they did in the Cold War.

In reviewing the perspectives of different nations and different options for pursuing arms control, examples show that continuing with Cold War policies will not be adequate to address proliferation. The disadvantages of continuing past policies are two-fold. First, they do not adequately address the changes in the world with respect to other major powers or regional powers. This disadvantage is further explored by discussing different perspectives in the United States and major and regional powers. Second, current arms control policies often overlook potential counterproductive impacts the policies may have over the long term. This disadvantage is further explored during a discussion of arms control and policy options. Recommendations are then made as part of a new framework for arms control. The goal of this paper is to facilitate the emergence of a Post-Cold War arms control paradigm that addresses current challenges just as containment and nuclear deterrence emerged after WWII.

United States Worldviews

American foreign policy advocates hold several different worldviews.

The development of containment and nuclear deterrence policies during the Cold War was the result of what was perceived as an overpowering threat and not consensus on an underlying worldview.³ American worldviews can be divided into at least six categories:

- Domestic Focus
- Balance of Power
- Global Leadership
- International Norms
- Spread of Western Values
- Autonomy

The main concepts for each of these worldviews are described below.

Domestic Focus. At the heart of a domestic focus is the assumption that the United States should abandon global leadership and turn inward. Domestic focus looks toward reducing defense expenditures in favor of domestic issues and improving U.S. economic competitiveness. Support for a domestic focus can be found in a joint 1998 Wall Street Journal and NBC News poll about important issues for the federal government that showed the first four concerns of the American public were domestic issues.⁴ The problem area most frequently identified by poll respondents (49 percent) was social programs, followed by crime at 23 percent, the economy at 22 percent and other domestic problems at 21 percent. Foreign policy and defense issues were tied with healthcare for fifth place at 17 percent. Even though there is support for a domestic focus, there is no agreement on what it would entail.

Advocates of a more domestic focus fall into additional categories. First, some argue that capitalism has triumphed and war between great powers is obsolete because nationalism is waning. This is

because a “transformation” is occurring where the interdependencies of a world market are eliminating war as a rational means of pursuing policy.⁵ A second argument for a more domestic focus revolves around the issue that in the current environment most U.S. allies rely on deployed American forces less and concerns about U.S. allies not equally carrying the defense burden. Current, unchanged U.S. defense policies in Asia, and the cost of maintaining troops in Korea and Japan running about \$35B annually support this argument.⁶ A third variation stresses that the best way America can help other nations is through the power of example. Advocates of this variation say the dissolution of the Soviet Empire is similar to when the European empires dissolved, and former colonial states looked to America for assistance. It was during this time that John Quincy Adams advocated avoiding wars of interest and intrigue and helped other nations by showing them the advantages of the American system.⁷

A domestic focus comes with advantages and disadvantages. The primary advantage of a domestic approach is improving the quality of life of Americans by shifting spending from defense to other areas. This is also a disadvantage because improving socioeconomic problems in the United States (tax policies, and so on) are unrelated to military expenditures.⁸ Another disadvantage of having a domestic focus is that even though it recognizes the growing interdependence of the American economy with international factors, it ignores the problem that increased interdependence makes the American economy more vulnerable. Attacking American interests no longer requires attacking the United States directly, because our prosperity and security depend more on the security and prosperity of other nations than ever before. A reason that the U.S. has larger defense budgets is that it has the largest global economic interests.⁹ Military power is needed to reinforce effective economic power, and international relations will continue to have a military security dimension. Another disadvantage of focusing primarily

on economic competitiveness is that it could lead to protectionism and other counterproductive policies and spending.¹⁰

Balance of Power. Balance of power is a more traditional view of nations. International relations are based on competing national objectives and avoiding a single nation dominating the international stage or strategic areas. The balance of power model is based on a few relatively equal great powers that act to oppose any coalition or single nation from gaining predominance. Here the central concern is power and maintaining stability in regions important to the security of the United States. The balance of power view would accelerate multipolarity in the world by weakening NATO and advocating additional coalitions, while opposing a single nation gaining dominance in any one region.¹¹ Under a multi-polar balance of power there will be no single unifying concept as there was in the Cold War, instead there would be more of a case-by-case approach as the United States faces a variety of threats from different sources.

The primary advantage of a balance of power approach is that it allows greater flexibility to address the different challenges posed by different regions. The primary argument against balance of power is that it ends up being a self-fulfilling prophecy where nations expecting others to pursue their interests guarantee everyone ends up pursuing their own interests. A second argument against balance of power is that it may be unrealistic to expect the United States to employ a balance of power strategy, because the American public may be reluctant to support one foreign regime against another.¹²

Global Leadership. Global leadership is similar to the balance of power view. The major difference is that global leadership tries to forestall a multi-polar world by deterring a return to a balance of power for as long as possible. This view sees the United States as an exporter of security and stability. Global leadership looks to maintain the United States' position as the world's preeminent military, economic, and

political power. This view stresses the current advantages the United States enjoys including the absence of a global rival or hostile alliances.¹³ Advocates of global leadership argue that following this view will forestall the rise of a hostile global competitor and build stronger partnerships among democratic allies. A disadvantage of global leadership is that it assumes the United States will continue to invest significantly in defense—something that is not happening. The dilemma is one of choosing either guns or butter, and without a clear threat to national survival advocates for military spending see funds going to other programs.¹⁴

International Norms. The focus of international norms is collective rather than unilateral action by the United States and it stresses expanding international society and increasing interdependence. The view of international norms holds that members of an international society adhere to widely accepted norms of internal and external behavior. The key then is to spread these international norms, while maintaining concern about the well being of others. International values are spread by international organizations like the United Nations, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and others. Advocates of this view say the United States should work with these organizations to expand international norms. American security is then achieved when the norms of international society are shared, defended, and secured collectively.¹⁵ The main disadvantages of the international norms worldview is that it does not deal adequately with existing problems of rogue nations, or the decreased ability to maintain consensus among nations in the absence of an overriding threat. Experience after Desert Storm is one of collective failures by the United Nations, NATO, and post-Gulf War coalitions, and undermines hope that international organizations can enforce peace.¹⁶ The reasons behind recent international peacekeeping failures are not focusing on the root causes that began the conflicts and incomplete understanding of the commitment required for achieving long-term

change. Finally, the United Nations has not been a part of major arms control agreements reached at the end of the Cold War.¹⁷

Spread of Western Values. The spread of western values would employ a broad range of measures by developed nations to spread the belief in the universal values of liberal democracy and effectiveness of market economies. The basic assumption of this view is that a world order based on the norms of democracy and free markets would be a better place. An advantage of this view is that it advocates taking a higher road or setting United States policy on values widely acceptable to the American public.

A view with a foundation based on values also comes with disadvantages. First, focusing on spreading Western values ignores the historical fact that democracies also engage in military conflict to advance their interests. Two hundred years of world history suggests that nations transitioning to democracies are more likely to engage in war than regimes, autocratic governments, or established democracies.¹⁸ Just changing the world into an American image will not guarantee lasting peace. Additionally, the assumption all countries wanted to imitate American free enterprise and democratic custom is faulty. This perspective actually contributed to the Cold War.¹⁹ The experience of Great Britain is also ignored. Britain enjoyed a single-power status nearly 200 years ago, and its altruism brought it isolation and enemies.²⁰ Finally, a policy of spreading western values ignores the fact that those values are not universally held. For example, fundamentalist Islam tries to resist western influence, in part, because they do not embrace American values.

Autonomy. The view of autonomy comes from seeing the world as a chaotic place where the United States only has permanent interests and no permanent friends. Advocates of autonomy support developing strategic independence or a long-term strategy where visions of transforming the world are replaced by pragmatic flexibility. Autonomy

would require more unilateral action by the United States and result in more transient relationships. A disadvantage of this view is that this behavior runs counter to American ideals of cooperation and support. Autonomy would also require rethinking long-standing American commitments to NATO, Israel, South Korea, and other nations.

Worldviews of Other Nations

Beyond understanding our own competing views, we must understand the views of other nations. By knowing how adversaries view the world and what they value we can better shape their impressions and responses. The discussion of other nations will focus on key major powers and regional nations in general.

Major Powers. The discussion of views held by major powers will be limited to the two major powers not currently aligned with the United States—Russia and China. In the Post-Cold War world, Russia and China, according to some analyses, are the two most important countries for the United States because of their size, military power, and economic potential.²¹ Relations are less antagonistic with both nations than they were during the Cold War. However, the long-range outcomes of current internal changes are unknown, and for several reasons their cooperation is required for the United States to follow several arms control options discussed later.

1. Russia

After the collapse of the Soviet Empire, Russia is still struggling to find its place in the world. Russia remains very unstable as it undergoes a revolution affecting everything except its ruling class.²² Russia's foreign policy has changed from initial cooperation with the West to a policy asserting nationalist concerns. This shift has occurred because Russia is trying to rebuild a sphere of influence.²³ Russia's former foreign minister, Yevgeny Primakov, regularly questioned U.S. leadership in Europe, the Persian Gulf, and Asia saying his goal was a "multi-polar" world.²⁴ It is noteworthy that Primakov's powers were

recently strengthened when he became Russia's Premier, and he has been filling in for the ailing Boris Yeltsin.²⁵ Russia's foreign policy will include arms sales because they involve prestige, maintain key industrial capabilities, and are a way to earn hard currency. According to Rosvooruzheniye, Russia's state arms trading company, Russia expects to export \$3.5 billion worth of arms to 58 countries this year, an increase of \$1 billion from 1997.²⁶ The amount of arms sales is expected to continue to increase. For example, it is estimated that over \$10 billion in contracts and debt are waiting on the end of the embargo of Iraq, one of Russia's largest trading partners.²⁷ There are significant economic advantages for official arms traffic and opportunities for unsanctioned arms traffic, because Russia has lost control over many internal resources.

Though unsanctioned arms sales may occur, that may be used as an excuse to cover official policy; several potential examples of this exist. Although U.S. officials notified the Russian government of a 22-ton shipment of special steel to Iran intended for making ballistic missile fuel tanks, Russia did not stop the shipment claiming there was not enough information to act.²⁸ Azerbaijan later stopped the shipment on the border it shares with Iran. Additionally, Boris Yelstin instructed biological warfare agent development be shut down. However, Kanatjan Alibekov, former deputy director of Biopreparat (Russian biological warfare development), says Russia continued to develop biological agents including variations of Anthrax and one based on the Ebola virus in violation of arms control treaties and Yelstin's instructions.²⁹ In another case, President Yelstin ordered a stop to all bombing of Chechen towns at the end of 1994, and Defense Minister Pavel Grachev gave public assurances that only reconnaissance missions were being flown; however, bombings continued.³⁰ Another disturbing example concerns reports that the Russian Mafia is trying to build an international network to sell weapons' grade nuclear material to the highest bidder.³¹ Poor record keeping and storage of nuclear materials in the former Soviet

Union make sales of nuclear material a threat that can not be easily dismissed.³² A final example with greater importance to Russia is that the Russian government is not strong enough to collect taxes.³³ Beyond not controlling Russian resources, there is the potential that Russia may be pursuing a policy of acting counter to U.S. interests.

Russian foreign policy may seek to discomfort America because nationalism is one thing that can rally domestic support behind rulers. There are several examples of Russia resisting non-vital American interests. First, over U.S. protests Russian research facilities have provided assistance to India's effort to develop a ballistic missile launched from submerged submarines.³⁴ Another example is Russian sales of surface-to-air missiles to the Greek Cypriot government. These sales increase tension between Greece and Turkey (both NATO countries) over Cyprus, which has been divided between them since 1975.³⁵ Finally, Russia also sold several gyroscopes used in controlling Scud missiles to Iraq in violation of the international embargo.³⁶ In summary, Russia remains a major power with internal problems that can be mollified by remaining involved in foreign policy.

2. China

China is the only major country with military spending today increasing in real terms.³⁷ China has ambitions and appears dissatisfied with the status quo; a result of Chinese perceptions of past wrongs and humiliations.³⁸ The United States is viewed with particular suspicion because of its influence over China's future security environment.³⁹ Because of this suspicion and other factors, the United States has less influence on domestic policies in China than in states of the former Soviet Union. China also has the problem of a regional competitor with India, and there is potential for continued friction between the countries. For example, India's Defense Minister, George Fernandes, has identified China and not Pakistan as India's number one potential threat.⁴⁰ Additionally, the defeat of a large Soviet and Chinese equipped force in

Iraq by the United States surprised Chinese leadership and may contribute to regional tensions as the Chinese military changes its doctrine and upgrades its forces.

China sees a more multi-polar environment in Asia as an opportunity to increase its influence. Additionally, China will try to prevent the emergence of a dominant power or alignment of powers opposed to it. Because of concerns about potentially restrictive alignments, China is skeptical of multilateral approaches to Asian security.⁴¹ Additionally, China resists pressure to improve its policies on non-proliferation and human rights. In the case of proliferation, China has helped Pakistan's nuclear weapon and ballistic missile programs, in part to help balance India.⁴² However, human rights abuses suggest that the largest threat to China is internal discontent.⁴³ Resistance to external forces is successful because the Chinese are quick to point out that nations opposing China risk undermining their economic interests, since China is the most populous country and has a rapidly growing economy.

Economic considerations appear to be dominating current Chinese policies. Weapons exports remain alluring to policymakers and Chinese defense industries. Chinese policymakers see arms sales as a foreign policy tool and a means of establishing political ties.⁴⁴ In the case of sales to Pakistan, the Chinese see the sales as stabilizing because they balance India. China's defense industry is motivated to pursue arms sales because the government no longer subsidizes their operations. The move to privatize government industries is viewed as a way to decrease social costs of state-owned enterprises that without the additional overhead would otherwise be profitable.⁴⁵ The move to more market forces further encourages exports as a way to increase sales. The interests of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) are also linked to the defense industry, because they run or influence companies including aerospace and communications companies, and they see increased sales as a method of accelerating defense modernization.⁴⁶ A further concern is that policy

makers may not be in full control of the PLA. China's President Jiang Zemin has recently begun an effort to increase party control of the PLA, China's most powerful institution, by publicly ordering the PLA to close down all businesses they run and support anti-smuggling.⁴⁷ Near-term agreements with China need to recognize that policy makers lack the internal controls to enforce policy pronouncements.⁴⁸ The implementation of Jiang Zemin's order to the PLA to close their businesses pits his prestige against the will of the Army, and may reveal the ability of China to implement future agreements.

From the standpoint of the United States the focus on economic considerations by China could result in further democratization or increased rivalry. In Asia, China's economic influence is growing and the United States' influence is declining. The current Asian financial crisis demonstrates this changing influence. The Asian crisis and Japan's delayed recovery from its 1990 stock market crash have facilitated China's growing influence in Asia. Actions the Chinese have taken include not depreciating their currency and increasing imports—actions that helped other Asian countries and increased China's prestige with them.⁴⁹ Recognition has also come from other world leaders because of the impact a devalued Chinese currency would have on international financial markets. Recent estimates show China's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and total military spending will exceed or at least rival the same figures for the United States by 2015.⁵⁰ However, in the near term China is more reliant on trade with the United States. As measured by GDP U.S.-China trade represents 8.3 percent of China's economy and one third of exports, while the same numbers for the U.S. are less than 1 percent of GDP and 3 percent of exports.⁵¹ This asymmetry in interests may be a source of friction in the future, particularly if the Asian financial crisis worsens and begins to affect China.

China is a major power with an increasing foreign policy role. This is clearly demonstrated by the recent nuclear tests by India and

Pakistan. Whatever the outcome, China will play a pivotal role in the outcome of tensions between India and Pakistan and any response to their crossing the nuclear threshold. President Clinton has highlighted the importance of China's help in Asia in his bid to renew China's most favored nation trade status.⁵²

3. Summary of Major Power Worldviews

In summary, both Russia and China desire a larger international role and already possess veto power in the United Nations Security Council. This desire is leading both nations to pursue policies for domestic and international reasons that do not support American initiatives. Negotiations with other powers without considering their views will have limited success. Of particular interest for arms control initiatives is that both nations are assisting regional nations in developing nuclear and ballistic missile technology. In the case of India and Pakistan, Russia and China are supplying material and technology to each side respectively.

Regional Powers. Understanding the worldviews of regional powers is important for at least two reasons. First, one factor that has been identified as contributing to the United States' failure in Vietnam was despite massive intelligence efforts to determine war fighting capabilities and intentions little effort was placed on identifying North Vietnamese values, beliefs, and decision-making styles, resulting in planners making "mirror image" assumptions.⁵³ Assumptions that other cultures are just like us did not apply then and do not apply today. Second, interactions between nations after the Cold War involve regional challenges more than global challenges. Third, this emerging world environment is one where the United States has decreased control because of increased capability of regional powers. In describing the point of view of regional powers, issues that face these nations will be generalized and not analyzed country by country. Both external and internal challenges face regional powers.

Externally, the end of the Cold War contributed to regional insecurity. Countries that had aligned with the Soviet Union saw the security guarantees provided by the Soviets disappear; leaving these client states without any form of external, extended deterrence. In the case of both nonaligned and Soviet aligned states, the end of the Cold War left them with only an indigenous political and military power; power that could be enhanced by pursuing the development of weapons of mass destruction.⁵⁴ In the case of non-aligned nations or American allies, the aspirations of former Soviet client states increase tension and competition. This tension drives a cycle of proliferation where regional rivals pursue weapon development or procurement programs to offset each other. Regional powers with local adversaries are more likely to make decisions about proliferation based on immediate security needs and not on policies of established nuclear powers.⁵⁵ Increased activism by the United States and the United Nations concern regional powers because intervention with regard to internal conflicts threatens their sovereignty.⁵⁶ Regional nations may conclude that possessing weapons of mass destruction is the only way of deterring major powers from becoming involved in their affairs. Longstanding U.S. national security strategies are under attack as regional powers obtain theater ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction.⁵⁷

Internal threats to regional powers result from their form of government and are not only limited to rogue nations but also to U.S. allies.⁵⁸ Regional powers are normally authoritarian or totalitarian regimes that are domestically unstable because they lack the legitimacy needed to justify their rule beyond their possessing power.⁵⁹ Totalitarian regimes mollify legitimacy concerns by stressing their ideological basis. In general, regional powers are run by the military or by civilian leadership that pays attention to military demands so they can stay in power.⁶⁰ This reinforces regional demand for military goods and technology. Another reinforcement for military spending is that leaders

see investment in military technology and production as a means to develop industry in general.⁶¹ Regional powers are still involved with nation building, and governments in these nations are highly personal and poorly institutionalized to the extent that they normally do not survive beyond the leadership of particular individuals. This is of particular concern when new and potentially hostile governments may inherit weapons of mass destruction developed clandestinely by the previous government. The most serious threats to national security for regional powers are internal, and how they respond to them can create international problems.

When there is an international crisis, it is important to realize that even when an international crisis for a regional power is an external event, its root cause is more often a function of internal problems; therefore, the stakes to the regional leader are higher.⁶² This leads to an asymmetry of stakes where the leaders of a regional power are fighting for their survival, making them harder to deter. An important consideration is that regional leaders can perceive the risk of not taking action as higher than risking action.⁶³ In summary, regional powers may act in seemingly crazy ways that can be rational when the perspective of the regional leadership is taken into account.

A Case for Balance of Power

When consideration is made for the views of major and regional powers, the balance of power worldview appears the most descriptive of what is happening. Balance of power better explains the lack of a unifying strategy in Post-Cold War America because the multi-polar environment does not directly threaten the continued survival of the United States. In fact, a single overarching policy may be inappropriate for today's decentralized world. Each of the worldviews, including balance of power, have disadvantages. The main disadvantage of pursuing balance of power is that it can be self-fulfilling. However, that can be an advantage if other major and regional powers are already seeking to

balance American influence. Historical evidence indicates that balances of power recurrently form and become evident when one nation acquires over half of the coercive capability in the international system.⁶⁴ For example, the United States was expected to dominate the post-World War II world; however, the Soviet Union emerged as an antagonist.⁶⁵ Similarly, the United States currently enjoys dominance in world affairs, and this is leading other nations to balance our influence.

The aspiration of power by different nations is the most important limitation on a state's freedom of action.⁶⁶ Both major and regional powers are pursuing policies to balance American influence, because American influence is pervasive. An unknown element in pursuing a balance of power approach is the impact that non-government organizations (NGOs) will have on nation states as they continue to increase in number and power. A potential role for NGOs is a partnership with governments in an educational program to reinforce the destabilizing effect of weapons of mass destruction. Balance of power is concerned less with the long-term decline or ascendancy of American power. Instead balance of power focuses more on the immediate concerns of a multi-polar world being more unstable and its limiting effects on United States influence in world affairs.

CURRENT ARMS CONTROL POLICIES

The aim of arms control is to reduce the probability that violent conflict could be successful, lower overall defense costs, and reduce the damage of violent conflict when it occurs. Interest in arms control seems to occur during times of technological and world balance of power change. It is appropriate that the United States begin to focus more on arms control because America has the most to lose if the status quo changes.

However, many have dismissed arms control as a Cold War relic, and a decreased priority on arms control is sending the wrong signal to aspiring

regional powers. The need for arms control has not changed, but the focus of arms control has changed. In the past, even regional nations have viewed arms control as an issue for major powers and not for their regions.⁶⁷ Instead, the focus now needs to be more on arms control for everyone. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a problem for everyone because it creates the potential for larger and more frequent loss of human life. To be successful, nonproliferation needs to do more than recognize the problem; it needs to include and consider the point of view of all nations.

The following sections discuss different policy options for limiting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, or encouraging nations to abandon developed capabilities. In addition to reviewing the different policies, potential counterproductive impacts they may have over the long term are discussed. The options addressed fall into five categories: cooperative relationships, deterrence, compellence, economic options, and confidence building. After reviewing the options, key findings are summarized.

Cooperative Relationships

The first option is to build cooperative relationships with other nations. From a multilateral standpoint NATO is an example of a successful cooperative relationship. The focus of future cooperative relationships, however, should involve collective security against nonspecific threats. Options for continuing multilateral cooperative relationships include expanding NATO, developing a similar alliance in the Pacific, and advocating regional alliances. The United States could also develop unilateral cooperative relationships with key regional nations. Under the Soviet model four conditions contributed to a cooperative relationship with a nation:⁶⁸

- Proximity of the nation to a region of concern,
- Reliance of the client nation on mutual trade,
- Similar national governments, and

- A well developed economy and professional military.

Several regional powers are fundamentally hostile to the United States and will work to reduce U.S. influence. In addition to balancing hostile nations, the United States needs to focus on nations that have an uncertain future, but who will have a profound impact on their region.⁶⁹ Building relationships with nations in different regions can help avoid regional hegemony. The more allied and developing nations rely on the United States, the more influence the United States will have over those nations. Still the degree to which the United States integrates with a regional government needs to consider the impact of that relationship on future governments because regional governments often do not survive beyond key individuals. This can result from revolutionary change or the lack of institutionalized and reliable arrangements for succession.⁷⁰ For example, the closeness of the U.S. relationship with the Shah of Iran contributed to a backlash against America when the Islamic government came to power. In the case of regional allies of the United States, democratic governments, open economies, and a professional military with a developed infrastructure will be important for fostering cooperation, allowing joint military training, and facilitating military exercises to deter aggression or combat it should it occur.

Deterrence

Deterring other nations involves dissuading actions against others by making the cost of taking action higher than not taking action. Current American deterrence objectives include deterring attack on the United States and its allies, aggression against American or allied vital interests, and use of WMD.⁷¹ Three elements are required for deterrence efforts to be successful.⁷² The first is communication, or clearly stating unacceptable actions and commitment to carry out our deterrent action. The second is capability, or having the ability to carry out the deterrent threat. The final element is credibility, or that there can be no reasonable doubt that an aggressor could take action without the deterrent threat

being carried out. These three elements of deterrence are necessary, but by themselves are not sufficient to guarantee success because of asymmetrical interests.⁷³

Beyond the elements required for deterrence, there are different circumstances in which deterrence occurs. First, deterrence can be general or immediate.⁷⁴ General deterrence provides deterrence through potential actions and involves rival nations maintaining retaliatory capability--even when overt threats are not made. Immediate deterrence provides deterrence through visible actions and involves threats of action. Immediate deterrence is more likely to fail than general deterrence, because in specific situations there is generally more pressure for an aggressor not to back down. One reason for this is a sense of escalation where policy makers commit additional resources to salvage previous investments.⁷⁵ Another distinction is that deterrence can be central or extended.⁷⁶ Central deterrence involves discouraging direct attacks against a person's own nation. Extended deterrence involves a nation trying to discourage attacks on an ally by a third nation. In the context of proliferation, extended deterrence is more applicable and can involve both general and immediate situations. The following paragraphs discuss options for nuclear and conventional deterrence in halting the development, deployment, and use of weapons of mass destruction.

In evaluating deterrence as a policy option, the first consideration is that at best deterrence is a stabilizing mechanism. This is because by itself deterrence does not remove the source of tension between countries. In general, deterrence is more successful when the aggressor has less at stake than the nation trying to employ deterrent measures. However, when deterring the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, a nation's regional security concerns will normally have more at stake. The United States has two military means of employing deterrence. The first is nuclear, and the second conventional.

Nuclear Deterrence. There are two ways nuclear deterrence can be implemented. The first, involving central deterrence, is threatening the use of nuclear weapons to deter attacks on American forces or territory. However, the role of American nuclear weapons in the Post-Cold War environment is unresolved. Before discussing what the United States should do, the policies of other nuclear powers must be examined. In Russia, the decline in conventional military capability has also increased the role of nuclear weapons in military doctrine.⁷⁷ China's policy is "no first use" of nuclear weapons and this gives it the moral high ground.⁷⁸ France has changed the role of nuclear weapons in its foreign policy, so nuclear weapons may be used to protect vital French interests against regional powers armed with weapons of mass destruction.⁷⁹ Britain has proposed adopting a policy similar to the French.⁸⁰ Stated policies of nations on the use of nuclear weapons are consistent with their security needs. However, the United States also needs to consider deterring attacks on allies.

Further extending America's nuclear umbrella to deter attacks on other nations is the second way to implement nuclear deterrence, and it involves extended deterrence. Specifically, the United States would refine the concept of mutual assured destruction (MAD) in the protection of regional powers against other regional powers. It appears that the U.S. may be moving away from an ambiguous policy on the use of nuclear weapons to one where they can be used as a deterrent. Presidential Decision Directive PDD-60 is reported to mention nuclear weapons as a deterrent or response to the use of chemical or biological weapons. However, relying on a declared policy of nuclear deterrence may not be appropriate as the next paragraph illustrates.

A policy indicating the United States would use nuclear weapons to deter weapons of mass destruction attacks presents several problems. First, nuclear responses against regional nuclear nations may not be appropriate, because most objectives could be achieved with

conventional weapons. Second, by declaring a policy for the use of nuclear weapons, the United States abdicates the moral high ground that the use of these nuclear weapons should be eliminated. This abdication is counterproductive in that it may force threatened nations to develop their own nuclear programs.⁸¹ Third, the actual use of nuclear weapons would be difficult to justify based on it being an equitable response. Fourth, a policy of nuclear extended deterrence may encourage proliferation, because of its limited credibility. For example, France was the first regional power to field nuclear weapons and French proliferation was born out of distrust of U.S. security guarantees.⁸² Proliferation could also be encouraged, because a policy of using nuclear weapons to deter proliferation of any weapon of mass destruction would elevate the relative importance of biological and chemical weapons. Finally, a rogue regional government that is already killing segments of its population may not be deterred by the threat of large losses, when the United States has more limited interests than a regime fighting for its survival.

If the only concern dealt with issues of central deterrence, there would be support for an American "no first use" policy. However, America must also consider extended deterrence, because it has national security pacts with over 50 nations.⁸³ Excluding chemical and biological weapon attacks from the nuclear umbrella may encourage allied nations to develop their own nuclear deterrent threat. There are disadvantages even if the American policy for the use of nuclear weapons with regard to weapons of mass destruction remains left ambiguous. An ambiguous policy on nuclear use has the advantage of allowing options for the use of nuclear weapons to accommodate continued change in the international environment. However, it also has disadvantages. First, it fails the first element of deterrence because the circumstances calling for nuclear retaliation are not communicated. Another element of deterrence is also ignored, because several issues make the American use of nuclear weapons less credible. These issues include adverse reactions by the

American public and other international powers in the event nuclear weapons were used against another nation when use of conventional capability may have sufficed. Beyond concerns about using nuclear weapons for deterrence, any policy, stated or ambiguous, that relies on their use is contradictory to the larger aim of making proliferation and the use of nuclear weapons inherently wrong in world affairs. The best use of nuclear weapons in regard to chemical and biological weapons, then, may be to use them in destroying the remaining superpower stockpiles of chemical and biological weapon agents.⁸⁴

Conventional Deterrence. Instead of relying on nuclear deterrence, deterrence with conventional capability could be used in immediate situations and is more credible in regional conflicts. This is true because the use of conventional force is more likely, and because the United States has demonstrated the capabilities of its forces. For conventional deterrence to work, military operations must convincingly invalidate the adversary's expectations of success. Conventional deterrence options include forward presence or power projection, preemptive strikes, and active and passive defenses.

Historically, the U.S. has put forces in harm's way as a forward presence in areas of concern. One reason for overseas deployment was to have U.S. forces on hand so that if they were engaged they would act as a triggering event for larger mobilization. Unfortunately, the number of different locations where the U.S. needs a forward presence to deter aggression has multiplied since the end of the Cold War. The reason for this is that growing interdependencies are expanding the number of regions where the U.S. has interests. However, the U.S. presence overseas has not paralleled the changes following the end of the Cold War. To address this the 1995 National Military Strategy issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff called for both overseas presence and deployment of continental United States (CONUS) forces to project power for "peacetime engagement, deterrence and conflict prevention, and fight to

win."⁸⁵ The importance of deployments in the future is clearly illustrated by the fact that during the 40 years of the Cold War American troops executed only 10 major deployments; however, there have been 27 since the end of the Cold War.⁸⁶ Determining whether conventional deterrence was successful is difficult, because it involves "proving why an event did not occur."⁸⁷

However, the importance of conventional forces in deterring aggression will grow with decreased stability in the international environment. An important consideration for conventional deterrence is that international law requires permission from allied nations to use bases in their countries during peacetime.⁸⁸ For example, the United States was only able to supply Israel during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, because of Portugal. American airlift at that time lacked in-flight refueling capability and could not make a non-stop flight to Israel. All other European allies refused to aid the American airlift from fears of disrupted oil supplies.⁸⁹ If allies refuse the use of their bases because of concerns about oil supplies, it is unlikely they will consent to American conventional forces when they are threatened by attack with weapons of mass destruction. This is because attacking a regional power possessing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) may invite a WMD attack. This increases the importance of Air Force assets, because they can exercise power projection with forces based in the United States. The primary advantage of the Air Force is that it can engage regional nations from beyond the range of their ballistic missiles.

Threats of preemptive strikes are another method of providing a conventional deterrent to nations considering developing weapons of mass destruction. The United States could establish a policy where nations developing WMD and posing an overt threat to the United States could have their forces attacked. Once deployed, the delivery means for WMD are vulnerable to attack and protecting them may be beyond the means of emerging powers.⁹⁰ Increased capability to locate and destroy

biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons as well as their delivery systems will help counter proliferation. To be credible the United States would need to convince nations that possessing weapons of mass destruction may invite attacks. There is risk associated with such a policy because if an attack is not fully successful, any surviving weapons could be used against the United States or its allies.

The threat of attacks leads to the final conventional option: developing and deploying active and passive defenses. If a nation cannot be deterred and if preemptive strikes are ruled too risky, effective defenses may be the only option. Developing an active regional ballistic missile defense would also decrease the viability of the primary means of delivering WMD that could be employed by regional nations without threatening the strategic balance of the major powers.⁹¹ However, the United States has invested at least \$38 billion and 15 years on missile defense without deploying an operational system.⁹² The primary antimissile system under development, Theater High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), failed five consecutive tests.⁹³ While a regional system may not violate the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty as it currently stands, a national missile defense system would. Additionally, a nationally based system would be very costly and could be circumvented by unorthodox delivery methods that might be employed. These innovative delivery methods include the hold of a cargo ship or improved technology, such as cruise missiles. National active defenses against small ballistic missile attacks would be expensive, inadequate, and potentially contribute to renewing the nuclear arms races between the established nuclear powers. Because current chemical and biological weapon countermeasures are inadequate, passive defense improvements can not be ignored.⁹⁴ Passive defenses like hardening weapon systems from electro-magnetic pulse effects and biological and chemical weapon defense gear, training, and antidote development could decrease perceived vulnerabilities of American forces to these weapons.

Deterrence Summary. Continued use of nuclear deterrence by the United States is not credible, and continuing a policy of ambiguity propagates existing disadvantages with non-proliferation and in obtaining cooperation from allies. Conventional deterrence alone has not been adequately demonstrated or developed, even though it is the most likely to be employed. However, conventional deterrence will never be demonstrated or developed to the extent needed without abandoning nuclear ambiguity. To help allay allied concerns the next step is to develop regional anti-ballistic missile defenses and improve passive defenses. Deterrence in any form is not perfect; however, conventional deterrence can and needs to be used as the primary American policy.

Compellence

If deterrence fails and nations carry out actions they were warned against, the focus needs to shift to compellence or exerting pressure until compliance is achieved. Deterrence is more general, indefinite, and passive in nature. Compellence is an active response to specific actions and will be lifted when an adversary complies. Compellence is more difficult because it costs an adversary more to openly submit to demands. The deployment of conventional forces could be carried out as either a method of deterrence or compellence. For example, the United States has deployed follow-on forces in anticipation of larger regional conflicts only five times in the last 50 years.⁹⁵ The cases include Europe at the beginning of the Cold War, Korea in 1950, Vietnam in the 1960's, the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, and Desert Storm. In only three of the five cases were the deployed forces later involved in sustained conflict.⁹⁶ Other policies involving compellence involve economic options.

Economic Options

There are several different economically oriented options for discouraging proliferation and controlling arms sales. As opposed to threatened military retaliation, economic options in general are less likely to directly threaten regimes. This is an advantage in the sense that

economic options avoid giving nations the feeling of being cornered. A disadvantage is that economic options are more easily discounted. Four different economic options for deterring the development, deployment, and use of weapons of mass destruction are discussed in the following sections.

Economic Sanctions. Economic sanctions are often the first tool used by the United States to influence other nations. From 1993 to 1996, 35 nations have been targeted by U.S. sanctions.⁹⁷ For example, India's and Pakistan's detonation of nuclear weapons in May 1998 were subject to sanctions under a 1994 law passed by Congress that bans direct U.S. aid and loans, and requires the U.S. to oppose assistance from international financial institutions.⁹⁸ However, the impact of economic sanctions on targeted nations is generally limited. In fact, sanctions usually hurt the general population, not those in power, and can strengthen domestic support of regimes.⁹⁹ Another irony of economic sanctions is that the increased integration and competitiveness in the world marketplace, decreases the viability of economic sanctions, because other countries are willing to move in and fill voids. The recent case of imposing sanctions on India demonstrates this, because France, Britain, and Russia did not impose immediate sanctions. Ironically, this can lead to U.S. firms losing more than the targeted nations. American business is hurt more because the U.S. economy is more closely linked to foreign markets than other nations with one third of the U.S. economy relying on exports.¹⁰⁰ The usefulness of continuing to apply economic sanctions will be limited. This fact is supported by congressional action to soften the impact of sanctions due to depressed American prices for farm products; agriculture credits to Pakistan and India are exempt from economic sanctions.¹⁰¹ Additionally, legislation was introduced to give the President the authority to grant waivers to the mandatory sanctions imposed by the 1994 Anti-Proliferation Act. Unilateral sanctions are

ineffective and counterproductive when the United States later softens them without concessions by proliferators.

Policy makers need to realize a prerequisite for imposing sanctions should be multilateral support. Even when multilateral sanctions are achieved they need to be enforced. The toleration of oil smuggling of Iraqi oil through Turkey, a United States ally, also undermines the usefulness of sanctions and the perception that they can be enforced.¹⁰² Multilateral support for sanctions, even in the face of nuclear proliferation with India and Pakistan, has not materialized and sends a message that nations with nuclear aspirations will not face major repercussions. If sanctions are going to be used, they need to be multilateral. However, sanctions alone will not be effective.

Export Controls. Export controls try to limit the spread of certain technologies. Technology diffusion to some extent is inevitable, and delaying it depends in part on the credibility of controls being in the best interest of everyone. For example, the spread of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and supersonic aircraft occurred over about 10 years.¹⁰³ In the case of supersonic aircraft and SAMs, there was no credible attempt at limiting the spread of the technology. Recent nuclear explosions by Pakistan and India aside, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has been largely successful in delaying the spread of nuclear weapons. Still the nuclear tests by Pakistan and India show that the hierarchy between nuclear and non-nuclear states is deteriorating. The NPT has been supported by additional control regimes trying to limit the spread of weapons of mass destruction in four areas: nuclear, chemical, biological, and delivery systems. The Nuclear Suppliers Group further targets controlling the spread of nuclear weapon technology from supplier nations, and contains 28 countries.¹⁰⁴ The Australia Group focuses on controlling biological and chemical weapons, although the Chemical Weapons Convention will probably become the controlling force for chemical weapons. Finally, the Missile Technology

Control Regime (MTCR) seeks to limit the spread of weapons of mass destruction delivery vehicles. This is promising because ballistic missiles are the most cost-effective delivery method for weapons of mass destruction.¹⁰⁵ Still more can be done. The recently released Rumsfeld report estimates the United States could be vulnerable to ballistic missile attack in just five years, and blames technology transfers by Russia, China, and the United States, as well as increased cooperation between rogue states and leaks of classified information and expertise.¹⁰⁶ For example, Iraq was reported to have three or four implosion devices that lacked only enriched uranium cores; obtaining nuclear material is regarded as more difficult than building the shell of a nuclear weapon.¹⁰⁷ Establishing export controls on key technologies is an important economic option. Export controls could involve both pursuing multilateral commitments, and acting unilaterally.

The environment for multilateral commitments is better than in the Cold War because the ideological motivation for sales has decreased. For the first time since World War II, major weapon suppliers do not have divergent interests. Despite economic incentives to sell weapons controlling arms transfers is feasible. Additionally, sales of advanced weapon systems come primarily from five sources: the United States, Russia, Great Britain, France, and China.¹⁰⁸ Additionally, transfer of some advanced technology like stealth is very tightly limited. An example of where a multilateral arms agreement has already shown promise is in the agreements that support the NPT. Another area of success is the Perm-5 Protocol of October 1991, where signatories agreed to register arms sales and avoid exports that would contribute to regional instability.¹⁰⁹ Still, more multilateral efforts need to be made, and they should focus on systems where technology can have a large impact with small numbers, where there are no substitutes from second-tier suppliers, and where the opportunity cost for lost sales is low. The best argument for controlling weapons that meet these criteria is that the more wide

spread these capabilities become, the more likely suppliers will be threatened by them. This includes the growing numbers of regional suppliers. Table 1 lists examples of technology or weapon systems that need to be limited.

Table 1: Technology or Weapon Systems that need to be Controlled

Stealth Aircraft and Technology
Submarines
Advanced Land and Sea Mines
Advanced Munitions, Sensors, and Guidance Systems
Ballistic and Cruise Missiles
Advanced Air Defense Systems
Advanced Reconnaissance and Communication Systems
Long-range Logistics Support Capabilities, such as Aerial Refueling
Chemical Agents and Biological Specimens

Implementing controls on the transfer of key technology may need the establishment of an international control authority. Because the economic impact that hard currency arms sales represent for Russia is higher than for either the United States or France, an international arms control organization may need to include market stabilizing mechanisms to compensate nations in special cases.¹¹⁰ A precedence for this was set when the United States bought 21 Mig 29 aircraft and 500 air-to-air missiles from Moldova for \$50 million and surplus equipment, when the aircraft and missiles would have otherwise been sold to Iran.¹¹¹

Unilateral controls that the U.S. can take involve monitoring dual-use technology more closely. Currently, controls on the shipment of 85,000 different biological specimens is left to a nonprofit organization founded in 1925, the American Type Culture Collection (ATCC).¹¹² An example of why biological specimens need additional controls is that in the 1980's the ATCC legally shipped over 70 vials of anthrax, botulism, and other deadly substances to Iraq.¹¹³ This should be of immediate concern because biological weapon agents are orders of magnitude more toxic than chemical nerve agents.¹¹⁴ Another example is

Iran's attempts to purchase the dual-use metal beryllium* from Kazakhstan.¹¹⁵ Finally, the United States contributed to the recent nuclear test by India by permitting the sale of nuclear technology in facilities not subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection.¹¹⁶ Sales to non-signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty without IAEA safeguards increase charges of discrimination from developing nations, and these sales need to stop. In summary, expanded and strengthened multilateral export controls have the most to offer, but unilateral actions can still be effective in some circumstance and can not be ignored.

Buy Compliance. The United States could try to buy compliance with existing treaties prohibiting nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. This compliance could be bought from nations willing to transfer or develop nuclear, chemical, biological weapons or delivery technologies. The United States has already followed a policy similar to this on several occasions. Most recently, during a visit by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Ukraine was persuaded to cancel a \$45 million deal with Iran to transfer nuclear technology.¹¹⁷ The fact that the United States has provided Ukraine with \$3.2 billion in aid over six years, the most for any country outside the Middle East, was a factor influencing Ukraine's decision.¹¹⁸ Also, in the fall of 1994, Project Sapphire bought 600 kilograms of weapons-grade uranium (enough nuclear material for 20 nuclear weapons) from Kazakhstan to ensure the material was properly protected.¹¹⁹ In another and as yet unnamed U.S. project in Kazakhstan, more than 6,000 pounds of high-grade plutonium will be moved more than 1,500 miles from a location near the Iran border to a more secure site in eastern Kazakhstan.¹²⁰ Additionally, the U.S. is

* Beryllium is a neutron reflector that can be used to lower the amount of fissionable material required to achieve critical mass. See Frank Barnaby, *How Nuclear Weapons Spread* (New York, NY: Routledge, 1993), 28.

trying to establish commercial projects in Russia's closed nuclear cities to avoid nuclear scientists leaving and helping aspiring nuclear powers.¹²¹

This is a valid concern, because workers at two Russian nuclear research centers have held strikes protesting five months of unpaid wages.¹²²

In addition to keeping nations from spreading this technology, the United States has provided incentives to keep nations from developing nuclear weapons. For example, under the 1994 Framework Agreement North Korea promised to begin dismantling its nuclear capabilities in stages in exchange for light water reactors and oil.¹²³ Under this agreement North Korea preserves the option of pursuing nuclear capability while at the same time agreeing to payments that delay but do not preclude nuclear capability.

Whether regional powers are neutral, friendly, or unfriendly, they learn from the example of nations hostile to America. Some lessons nations could learn from these transactions might be against U.S. long-term interests. First, Western reaction to weapons of mass destruction has made regional powers realize that these weapons complicate American planning. Second, a perverse result of following a policy of buying compliance is that it may actually encourage nations to begin development of these weapons so they can be paid to stop. Third, the agreement with North Korea also had the affect of weakening the Non-Proliferation Treaty, because it effectively rewarded and did not punish past violations. Finally, economic inducements will not always work because neither diplomatic nor economic inducements will dissuade regimes with expansionist aims or fear for their own survival.

Military Assistance. Military assistance to other nations can be either in the form of weapons or infrastructure. If a balance of forces is maintained, providing weapons to other nations can increase security and decrease incentives for proliferation. However, military assistance that creates an imbalance can create arms races that may lead to proliferation. Military assistance in the form of weapons also has the disadvantage of

diverting resources from the civilian to military sector in the country receiving the aid and tends to retard economic development.¹²⁴ Military assistance in the form of infrastructure tends to accelerate economic development. Infrastructure improvements would also ensure that facilities needed for joint military exercises or short-notice U.S. deployments existed; something that can still increase the security of nations receiving aid.

Summary: Economic Options. Strengthening export controls should be the first priority under economic options. The most used option, economic sanctions, is often not credible and can be counterproductive. The shortcomings of economic sanctions often result in their being relaxed without concessions from the opposing side. Buying compliance allows greater flexibility to address unique situations; however, the message these agreements send and their longer-term impacts need to be considered and balanced with short-term gains. Military assistance needs to be concerned less with sales of weapon systems and more with infrastructure. Focusing on infrastructure aid can help the economy of the country and can facilitate the ability of the U.S. to deploy forces needed for conventional deterrence.

Confidence Building

The last option discussed is building confidence between the United States and other nations, and between rival regional nations. The goal of confidence-building measures is to reduce the tensions between states, reduce the threat of war, enhance cooperation, and eliminate the risk of surprise attack.¹²⁵ A current example is a recent agreement to increase U.S. and Chinese military ties with the goal of advancing our military relationship.¹²⁶ It must be recognized that building confidence between adversarial states can be a long process. Lessons from arms control agreements in Europe during the Cold War suggest that the more productive elements of initial arms control agreements include establishing communication, exchanging information, including

notification of exercises, and allowing access of observers.¹²⁷ Something that can help bring regional rivals with nuclear capability together is that people do not want crises to escalate to nuclear war. Reducing the secrecy between rival nations particularly on military matters is the foundation of confidence building.

A primary benefit of arms control is that it allows nations to open dialogue when they might not have otherwise. Once negotiations are started, the negotiations themselves can help improve political conditions between nations. One reason cited for the failure of the United States in opening Cuba since 1961 is that the United States does not possess direct political, economic, or military ties with Cuba.¹²⁸ A criticism of United States policy offered by retired General Shalikashvili, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is that we “don’t talk to people (countries) we don’t like, but those are the ones we need to talk to the most.”¹²⁹ Instead of trying to isolate pariah nations, the United States should work on opening dialogue.

Confidence-building measures are not a panacea. One disadvantage of confidence-building measures is that they try to embrace the status quo and can be used to deflect discussion of larger issues.¹³⁰ Also, merely relying on the benefits of negotiation without ensuring the outcomes of negotiations are implemented will be counterproductive. Confidence-building measures are as much work as any other international initiative and will require more than passing attention to be successful.

Summary

The focus of arms control is changing. It now deals with issues affecting all nations and not just the super powers. The policy options available to counter proliferation span responsibilities in different American agencies. A cohesive arms control effort will require greater interagency cooperation, because it will involve both inherently political and military issues. If “war is politics by other means” as Clausewitz admonished,

then politics and economics are both war by other means. The purpose of war is to change behavior by targeting the human mind. It is the survivors who see mounting losses and negotiate peace—not the casualties. In an environment with less violent conflict, the focus needs to change on how to understand and influence others by influencing their perceptions—topics familiar to arms control efforts. Focusing on influencing others will allow a shift from expending energy and resources from better ways to destroy to better ways of subduing hostile will. Understanding the perspective of other nations is key to implementing non-violent influence.

In reviewing current policy options some key findings emerge. First, the United States needs to develop closer relationships with countries that will have an impact on key regions. Key considerations in building these relationships are that the country has a similar government, an open economy, a professional military, and adequate infrastructure to support joint military exercises. Second, deterrence is still required, but nuclear deterrence by the United States is no longer credible and can be counterproductive to non-proliferation. The result is that conventional deterrence as the primary method of deterrence needs to be developed and demonstrated. Additionally, because of their quick deployment and long-range precision-strike capabilities, the role of the Air Force will probably increase in scenarios with regional powers possessing weapons of mass destruction. Third, economic sanctions are ineffective and hurt the population and not the leaders they are targeted against. There may be situations where multilateral sanctions would be appropriate; however, the United States should discontinue implementing unilateral economic sanctions. Fourth, export controls have been used to limit proliferation and support the Non-Proliferation Treaty. However, more can be done to limit the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons through unilateral and multilateral export controls. Fifth, military assistance, when provided, needs to focus more on infrastructure

development and deal less with weapon system sales. Building a nation's infrastructure has the dual purpose of aiding their economy and facilitating joint military exercises. Finally, confidence-building measures need to be pursued with more than lip service, because for confidence-building measures to succeed takes as much work as other options discussed.

A NEW FRAMEWORK

A new framework for approaching non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and arms control could focus on a two-fold policy initiative. The first policy would be a new strategic "triad" built around conventional capability including rapidly deployable forces, regional ballistic missile defense, and long-range precision-strike capability. The second policy would employ an information strategy using the current diplomatic initiatives that appear to be the most productive, or unilateral and multilateral export controls, military assistance in the form of infrastructure, and confidence-building measures. Each of these policies is discussed more in the following sections.

Conventional "Triad"

America should abandon an ambiguous nuclear use policy by formalizing a "no first use" of nuclear weapons in conjunction with strengthening the role of conventional deterrence. A "no first use" policy combined with a focus on conventional forces can make proliferation less attractive.¹³¹ Deterrence through conventional forces gives America the moral high ground and answers criticisms from regional nations that the non-proliferation regimes are discriminatory. Focusing on conventional deterrence will also encourage allied nations to support American conventional operations. Allies are unlikely to consent to American conventional forces when they are threatened by attack with weapons of mass destruction—unless conventional deterrence is the only option

offered. A conventional deterrent triad would involve long-range precision-strike capability, rapid deployment of forces, and a regional ballistic missile defense system. The key and as yet undemonstrated element of a conventional triad will be a regional ballistic missile defense, although, Israel has successfully test-launched its system, Arrow, against a simulated target.¹³² An option being developed by the Air Force is the Airborne Laser Program, which is currently building a prototype system for demonstration on a Boeing 747.¹³³ Credibility of a conventional triad will require that it be demonstrated through joint exercises in regions of concern. Finally, focusing on conventional deterrence will require rethinking American doctrine and force structure, something the Air Force has already begun by reorganizing into ten Air Expeditionary Forces (AEFs).

Diplomatic Initiatives

Opening dialogue with other nations could be the foundation of a new strategy: an information strategy focusing on increasing communication and easing military, economic, and diplomatic pressure as a means of opening societies.¹³⁴ The goal of an information strategy would be to convince all nations that the existence of weapons of mass destruction is: 1) counter-productive, 2) a threat to everyone, and 3) not a legitimate option in conflict. A potential first step in implementing an information strategy was taken with the release of a Brookings Institution report listing the cost of the American nuclear program at \$5.8 trillion dollars, the second most expensive single program behind Social Security.¹³⁵ Convincing the world about the rightness of possessing weapons of mass destruction would at first be less important than undermining the utility of using them as a coercive threat. In other words, if a majority of the international community believes a weapon or method is illegitimate and pariah states believe that resolve will be backed by a strong response, then use or possession of those weapons and methods is less advantageous.

Because weapons of mass destruction are not going to just disappear, the first diplomatic initiative needs to increase the effectiveness of export controls. Multi-lateral agreements with suppliers are preferred, but unilateral action by the United States can be effective. First, dual-use technology should not be sold to any nation that is not a signatory of key non-proliferation treaties. Second, controls need to be implemented for biological agents. The goal of export controls is to slow the diffusion of technology and material as consensus against the use of weapons of mass destruction grows.

The second diplomatic initiative would be to focus on military assistance in the form of infrastructure projects such as roads, airfields, and ports. These projects could help develop regional nation economies and ensure needed infrastructure is available for United States military exercises or deployments. A prerequisite for military assistance is establishing agreements with host nations to allow for the deployment of American forces and potential prepositioning of equipment. Military assistance in the form of infrastructure would help develop conventional deterrence and could lead to closer ties with key nations. Depending on implementation, infrastructure assistance could help American companies by awarding development projects to them and in helping to provide access to developing nations.

The final diplomatic initiative is confidence-building measures. Currently, advocates of confidence-building measures talk of a "Field of Dreams" where if confidence-building activities are started benefits will come. Confidence-building measures are as painstaking a process as other diplomatic initiatives, and care needs to be taken to ensure confidence-building measures are not applied as a panacea solution. However, if given the status of a serious diplomatic initiative, confidence-building measures can decrease tensions and provide a foundation for additional agreements. The United States needs to work at bringing regional adversaries together to begin negotiations and

making the development, deployment, and use of weapons of mass destruction illegitimate.

CONCLUSION

The world is a much different place after the Cold War, and continued success requires abandoning Cold War policies. Emerging policies will need to appreciate different worldviews in the United States and other nations. Following a balance of power orientation will allow policy makers to tailor policies to different challenges without being restricted by an overarching tenet. Good intelligence will be a key factor in the success of any policy orientation and its supportive policies. Arms control remains important in the Post-Cold War world, but its focus needs to change from arms control involving the superpowers to arms control for everyone. If the United States is not proactive in influencing other nations, others with ideas potentially adverse to American interests will fill that role. A potential framework for arms control policies involving a conventional triad and diplomatic initiatives is suggested to stimulate discussion.

During the course of this research, several opportunities for further research were identified. First, the future role of Non-Government Organizations in the Post-Cold War world and in relation to arms control specifically was not addressed but could prove to be important. Second, the impact of technology diffusion and dual-use technology on arms control needs closer evaluation. Not only the weapons but the knowledge behind them is diffusing, and detecting whether nations have the knowledge to make weapons is harder than detecting physical resources required to manufacture, store, or deliver weapons. Third, the examination of conventional deterrence and its role and implementation needs closer examination and definition. Finally, a study of how to apply the proposed framework to Asia, the region that

presents the largest current challenge, could further define the policies and implementation challenges.

GLOSSARY

Arms Control: Policies designed to reduce the probability that violent conflict will be successful, lower overall defense costs, and reduce the damage of violent conflict when it occurs.

Autonomy: American worldview that advocates the United States taking more unilateral action and where visions of transforming the world are replaced by pragmatic flexibility.

Balance of Power: Worldview where international relations are based on competing national objectives and no single nation dominates the international stage or strategic areas.

Compellence: Policies designed to exert pressure on nations until compliance is achieved after deterrence fails.

Confidence Building: Policies designed to reduce secrecy between rivals and promote communication.

Cooperative Relationships: Policy designed to create alliances to balance the influence of nations hostile to the United States or increase stability in regions.

Deterrence: Dissuading actions by making the cost of taking action higher than not taking action.

- Central: Involves discouraging attacks on a person's own nation
- Conventional: Using conventional capability to deter attacks
- Extended: Policy intended to discourage an attack on a third nation
- General: Provides deterrence through potential actions without making direct threats
- Immediate: Provides deterrence through positive action and threats
- Nuclear: Using nuclear weapons to deter attacks against your own or other nations

Domestic Focus: American worldview advocating reducing defense expenditures to focus on domestic issues and increasing economic competitiveness

Economic Sanctions: A variety of policy options designed to hurt the economies of target nations.

Export Controls: Policies designed to limit the spread of targeted technology.

Global Leadership: American worldview that advocates the United States pursue policies that would forestall a return to a balance of power.

International Focus: Worldview that advocates expanding international society and increasing interdependence, so that more nations would adhere to international norms.

Military Assistance: Providing either weapons or infrastructure to nations in an attempt to increase the security of the nation and maintain a balance within the region.

Proliferation:

- **Horizontal:** acquisition of weapons by a country that had not possessed them before.
- **Vertical:** improvement in weapon capability or increase in quantity of weapons by a country that already possessed them.

Spread of Western Values: American worldview that advocates the United States promote the universal values of liberal democracy and market economies, because of a belief that a world where these values are shared would be a better place.

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HQ USAFA/DFES
2354 Fairchild Drive, Suite 5L27
USAF Academy CO 80840

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(719) 333-2717
DSN: 333-2717
FAX: 333-2716